Should Central Banks Supervise Facebook Credits?

This is an interesting question that I've been keeping an eye on for sometime now. Forbes is the latest media outlet to wonder whether Facebook Credits are going to be deemed systemic and somehow in need of regulatory supervision. They cite estimates that Facebook Credits total "$470 million of revenue in 2011, or about 11% of Facebook’s total business."

Financial regulators haven't been terribly interested in Facebook Credits because they merely constitute 'closed loop' stored value, rather than 'open-loop' stored value or 'e-money'. The line of demarcation is somewhat open to conjecture, but as explained below it seems likely that the Facebook Credits programme (as currently configured) will remain outside the scope of regulation. However, Facebook could decide to make things really interesting by 'opening the loop'  to become a full-scale e-money issuer...

When you buy Facebook Credits you're really just buying a 'claim code', like you would a music download, and that code is redeemable for purchases of items on the Facebook.com platform. The code is purchased from and redeemed by the same Facebook entity (if you're a resident of or have your principal place of business in the US or Canada, it's Facebook, Inc., otherwise, it's Facebook Ireland Limited). This means the suppliers of items you buy don't actually redeem the Facebook Credits themselves. Instead they rely on Facebook to process that transaction, and the suppliers receive only 70% of the price of the items sold, after Facebook deducts its commission or fees. The terms and conditions also make it clear that the 'credits' aren't able to be re-sold or transferred to anyone outside of Facebook. All of this means Facebook Credits are 'closed loop' stored value.

Typically, the European Commission has been the most aggressive in trying to comprehensively regulate e-money (and everything else!). That's largely arisen from efforts to break open the continental 'banking monopoly', starting with retail payments. As a result, issuing e-money in the European Economic Area (EEA) is a regulated activity under the second 'E-money Directive', and its use in retail payment transactions is covered by the Payment Services Directive. The two directives have been implemented in the UK by The Electronic Money Regulations 2011 and the Payment Services Regulations 2009. Essentially, this creates a framework within non-banks can be authorised to process retail payments.

Key regulatory requirements related directly to E-money include official authorisation/supervision, minimum and ongoing capital requirements and the need to safeguard (insure or segregate) money corresponding to outstanding E-money. “Electronic money” is defined as:

"...electronically (including magnetically) stored monetary value as represented by a claim on the electronic money issuer which—(a) is issued on receipt of funds for the purpose of making payment transactions; (b) is accepted by a person other than the electronic money issuer; and (c) is not excluded by regulation 3;" [my italics].

Parking the various issues with the real meaning and scope of "payment transactions", it's clear from the relevant terms and conditions that Facebook Credits are not accepted by anyone other than the relevant Facebook entity. Technologically speaking, it also seems likely that none of the suppliers of items purchased with Facebook Credits would be able to recognise and redeem the unique claim codes. Furthermore, both of the regulation 3 exemptions are relevant in the context of Facebook Credits:

"3. (a) monetary value stored on instruments that can be used to acquire goods or services only—

(i) in or on the electronic money issuer’s premises; or
(ii) under a commercial agreement with the electronic money issuer, either within a limited network of service providers or for a limited range of goods or services;"

which is generally referred to as the 'limited network' exemption; and a 'digital goods' exemption (which also applies to services) for:

"...(b) monetary value that is used to make payment transactions executed by means of any telecommunication, digital or IT device, where the goods or services purchased are delivered to and are to be used through a telecommunication, digital or IT device, provided that the telecommunication, digital or IT operator does not act only as an intermediary between the payment service user and the supplier of the goods and services."

The digital goods exemption is pretty clear cut, and probably applies to most of what Facebook Credits are used for. But being able to pay for a trip to the movies, as Forbes reports occurred in the US last summer, would likely fall outside the EU digital goods/services exemption if it occurred in the European Economic Area. So that puts pressure on the extent to which Facebook can claim to be a "limited network" of service providers or only providing access to "a limited range of goods or services". And if that exemption fell away, we'd be back to whether a participating merchant could be deemed to be 'accepting' Facebook Credits. 

The meaning of "limited" is left undefined in the legislation, probably to give the authorities a broad enough discretion to act where they think it's necessary or appropriate. However, the ordinary dictionary meaning does not equate to 'small', 'narrow' or 'few', so the size of the programme of itself shouldn't be a problem.

Nevertheless, it seems that the scope, scale and growth of the Facebook Credit programme is continuing to provoke policy discussion about its regulatory status, particularly as to whether there are systemic grounds on which Facebook should be segregating customer funds related to oustanding stored value and whether it has some kind of unfair cost advantage over authorised E-money institutions.

I discussed the policy issues related to operational risk, safeguarding and competition concerns in the context of other limited network offerings during the UK consultation on the introduction of the 2011 regulations. Incredible as it may seem, I think these will recede as the eventual scale of 'proper' E-money issuance will gradually grow to vastly exceed the quantity of Facebook Credits in issue - unless Facebook decides to enter the E-money market itself and go 'open-loop'. Now that would be interesting.

Red Tape Challenge Submission - Summary

In its invitation to submit evidence of ‘red tape’ that is inhibiting the developmentof ‘disruptive business models’, the Cabinet Office notes the example of Zopa, “a company that provides a platform for members of the public to lend to each other, who found that financial regulations simply didn’t know how to deal with a business that didn’t conform to an outdated idea of what a lender is…” 

Financial regulation similarly fails to deal with a range of non-bank finance platforms that share some of the key characteristics of Zopa’s person-to-person lending platform. Accordingly, financial regulation is failing to enable the cost efficient flow of surplus funds from ordinary people savers and investors to creditworthy people and businesses who need finance. In particular, the current framework: 

1. generates confusion amongst ordinary people as to the basis on which they may lawfully participate on alternative finance platforms (even though some are licensed by the Office of Fair Trading); 
2. does not make alternative finance products eligible for the usual mechanisms through which ordinary people save and invest, exposing lenders to higher ‘effective tax rates’; 
3. discourages ordinary savers and investors from adequately diversifying their investments; 
4. incentivises ordinary savers and investors to concentrate their money in bank cash deposits, and regulated stocks and shares; 
5. inhibits ordinary savers’ and investors’ from accessing fixed income returns that exceed long term savings rates; 
6. inhibits the development of peer-to-peer funding of other fixed term finance (e.g.mortgages and project/asset finance, and even short term funding of invoices); and
7. protects ‘traditional’ regulated financial services providers from competition. 

These regulatory failings could be resolved by creating a new regulated activity of operating a direct finance platform, for which the best-equipped regulatory authority would be the Financial Services Authority (as replaced by the Financial Conduct Authority). Regulation of the platform would be independent of any regulation that may apply to the type of product offered to participants on the platform (e.g. loans, trade invoices, debentures to finance renewable energy and lending for social projects). Proportionate regulation that obliges platform operators to address operational risks common to all products would also enable economies of scale and sharing of consistent best practice, and leave product providers and other competent regulators to focus solely on product-specific issues (e.g. consumer credit, charitable purposes). 

Similarly, there is no reason why products distributed via these platforms should not also be eligible for the usual mechanisms through which ordinary people save and invest, such as ISAs, pensions and enterprise investment schemes.

I'm off to Number 10 today to discuss these issues, and will be submitting a more detailed paper in the coming weeks, both to the Red Tape Challenge and the BIS Taskforce on alternative business finance. I'm interested in any comments you may have.

The Nature of Scepticism

Readers of Pragmatist will know that I've expressed my bemusement before that auditors have to be taught how to be sceptical. That was back in March. In November, the European Commission confirmed that the Financial Reporting Council wasn't joking:

"Article 15

Professional scepticism

When carrying out the statutory audit of a public-interest entity, the statutory auditor or audit firm shall maintain professional scepticism throughout the audit, recognizing the possibility that a material misstatement due to facts or behaviour indicating irregularities, including fraud or error could exist, notwithstanding the auditor's or firm's past experience of the honesty andintegrity of the audited entity's management and of the persons charged with its governance.

The statutory auditor or the audit firm shall maintain professional scepticism in particular when reviewing management estimates relating to fair values and the impairment of goodwill and other intangible and future cash flow relevant to the consideration of the going concern.

For the purposes of this Article, 'professional scepticism' means an attitude that includes a questioning mind, being alert to conditions which may indicate possible misstatement due to error or fraud and a critical assessment of audit evidence."

Proposal for a regulation on specific requirements regarding statutory audit of public-interest entities.

Next: a European Regulation governing the exercise of scepticism in the course of police interviews...  


Hat-tip to Mark from last night's London New Finance Meet-up. Image from The Philosopher's Magazine.

Alternatives To Traditional Business Funding

Huge thanks to MarketInvoice for the kind invitation to their event at the Cass Business School yesterday. The event really highlighted the gravity of the SME funding situation and the giant leap in understanding that is required of politicians and policy-makers in this area.

Chuka Umunna MP, Shadow Secretary for BIS, gave the keynote, and the panel included Andrew Cave, the Head of Policy at the Federation of Small Businesses, Emmanouil Schizas of ACCA Global, as well as Anil Stocker of MarketInvoice and Andy Ralph, director of a company that has raised significant amounts of invoice finance in the past quarter. 

Chuka gave some useful context:

• All the recent banking industry figures point to a significant contraction in lending to SMEs in the past quarter. Worse, SME Finance Monitor says over half of SMEs applying for overdrafts this year for the first time have been refused, and more than 400,000 SMEs who wanted to apply for an overdraft in the third quarter  didn’t do so – a third because they were discouraged by their bank.
• A recent BACS report also suggests that "half of all the UK’s small and medium sized enterprises are awaiting late payments. On average, each firm is owed £39,000 in late payments, with the total amount owed to SMEs having reached a staggering record figure of £33.6bn."

Less helpful, however, were Labour's proposed solutions to this mess. In summary, notwithstanding his glowing endorsement of MarketInvoice's as a useful private sector alternative to bank finance and the acknowledged need for more non-bank competition, Chuka said that Labour wants:

• Banks to improve local relationship management;
• The government to be more active and directly involved in improving payment and supply chain management;
• To create a new agency along the lines of the US Small Business Administration and Small Business Investment Company programme, whereby SBICs use their own capital plus funds borrowed with an SBA guarantee to make investments in qualifying small businesses - a phenomenal soure of moral hazhard and downright fraud that's been well documented by David Einhorn in his US Senate Committee testimony and the book "Fooling Some of the People All of the Time"; and
• To use government procurement to help SMEs (notwithstanding Labour's notorious reputation for waste in that area).

Perhaps it's beyond his shadow brief, but it was notable that Chuka made no mention of the discussion of alternative regulatory solutions here and in the US, nor the Cabinet Office focus on red tape that inhibits disruptive business models that specifically identifies alternative finance platforms. There was no reaction to the suggestion that alternative payment providers should enjoy the same tax subsidies that banks and other regulated institutions enjoy through ISA/pension allowances and individuals' ability to off-set losses against income. And no thought appeared to have been given to the idea of a clearly defined 'safe harbour' for the likes of MarketInvoice and peer-to-peer platforms from the rules on collective investment schemes and/or arranging deals in investments, to enable them to start up more confidently, quickly and efficiently.

In fact, Chuka's pitch rather underscored his party's role in helping to create our desperate need for alternatives to traditional business funding. Let's hope we see some decent ideas from the opposition in future.

In the meantime, it's down to the participants on MarketInvoice, Funding Circle and CrowdCube and the many angel networks to carry the alternative funding hopes of SMEs.

A New Regulatory Model For Retail Finance - Update 1

"It's time for reflection..." FT.com

The fact that the US has taken the first step towards a 'Crowdfunding Act' requires an update of my earlier post on a new regulatory model for retail finance...

Non-bank retail finance models have been gaining momentum worldwide over the past six years, in spite of our creaking financial regulatory framework. Finally, it seems that framework is about to become more directly supportive. 

Since 2005 we have seen the launch of various innovative person-to-person, or peer-to-peer (P2P) finance platforms in the UK, US, Germany and elsewhere, which have been tracked here. These were launched by teams that spent considerable time and expense trying to accommodate existing regulation that favoured incumbents, with little or no regulatory assistance. Their goal was to enable those with surplus cash to connect directly with people who needed finance in a way that minimises costs and delay, and leaves most of the 'margin' with lenders and borrowers, rather than the middleman.

Meanwhile, we have all discovered that the existing financial regulatory framework, ironically designed to protect consumers, actually guaranteed the worst excesses amongst 'traditional' banks and failed to contain the risks posed by the "shadow banking" system. And although taxpayers have had to step in and effectively democratise the financial markets, we are still unable to extract badly needed funding from retail banks.

Against that background, it is perverse that the regulatory framework does not already directly facilitate simple, low cost, alternative financial services. And let's not forget that banks and other retail investment institutions continue to enjoy indirect tax subsidies through individuals' ability to off-set losses, as well as ISA and pension allowances for which unregulated alternative investments do not qualify.

While substantial innovation in consumer and small business lending has been possible, UK rules against marketing investments like bonds, shares and unregulated collective investment schemes, have made it much harder to offer direct, alternative funding for SME start-ups, trade finance and even social projects. Given a more proportionate investment regime, the likes of Crowdcube, MarketInvoice, Buzzbnk, Social Impact Bonds and the Green Investment Bank, for example, might operate rather differently. No doubt existing and new P2P platforms would take the opportunity to distribute multiple financial instruments, creating a far more substantial alternative to banks and other fee-hungry investment institutions.

Oddly, given its reputation for fast-paced innovation, the US has been (until recently) even less supportive of alternative retail financial models. Zopa, for example, which led the growth of P2P platforms with its launch of person-to-person lending in the UK, was unable to launch that model in the US despite lengthy consultations with securities regulators. And life has been unnecessarily complicated for the likes of Prosper and Lending Club ever since.

To help remedy the regulatory imbalance, as mentioned in August, three of the leading UK commercial P2P lending facilitators launched the Peer-to-Peer Finance Association (P2PFA) for platforms on which the majority of lenders and borrowers are consumers or small businesses (rather than, say, ‘investment clubs’ or networks of sophisticated investors). The P2PFA has adopted a set of self-regulatory measures that are based on similar FSA requirements for payment services platforms (which have a similar, low risk profile). In particular, the P2PFA Operating Principles require:

1. Senior management systems and controls;
2. Minimum amounts of capital;
3. Segregation of participants’ funds;
4. Clear rules governing use of the platform, consistent with the Operating Principles;
5. Marketing and customer communications that are clear, fair and not misleading;
6. Secure and reliable IT systems;
7. Fair complaints handling; and 
8. The orderly administration of contracts in the event a platform ceases to operate
9. Appropriate credit assessment and anti-fraud measures

Earlier this month, the US House of Representative has passed a Bill HR 2930 (still subject to Senate and Presidential approval) which would enable the issuer of securities to raise small amounts of money from many people (crowdfunding) on the basis summarised below. Please note that I've used the helpful summary from VentureBeat, but replaced "company" with "issuer", as I see no reason on my reading of the bill and the definition of "issuer" in the Securities Act 1933 why this would not enable person-to-person lending, rather than merely raising capital for corporations (please seek your own independent legal advice):

• "The [issuer] may only raise a maximum of $1 million, or $2 million if the [issuer] provides potential investors with audited financial statements.

• Each investor is limited to investing an amount equal to the lesser of (i) $10,000 or (ii) 10% of his or her annual income.

• The issuer or the intermediary, if applicable, must take a number of steps to limit the risk to investors, including (i) warning them of the speculative nature of the investment and the limitations on resale, (ii) requiring them to answer questions demonstrating their understanding of the risks, and (iii) providing notice to the SEC of the offering, including certain prescribed information.”

Will this work in practice?

Absolutely. The challenge (and benefit) associated with such 'safe harbours' is that there is very little room for fee income. This in turn favours 'thin intermediaries', like the new electronic finance platforms, as a means of broad, open distribution. Proportionately regulating platforms to address horizontal issues like those covered by the P2PFA Operating Principles leverages economies of scale, leaving product providers to focus only on vertical product-specific requirements. Specifically, the platforms can control operational risk (including anti-money laundering); deliver transparency through adequate product disclosure and ‘my account’ functionality; and centralise customer service and complaints handling, with ultimate referral to financial ombudsmen or other complaints handling bodies. In addition, because the platforms provide a reliable audit trail, tax rules should permit losses to be off-set against gains and income derived via platform-related activity. Similarly, there is no reason why instruments distributed via these platforms should not also qualify for consumers’ tax-free ISA and pension allowances.

Further, the 'horizontal' form of credit intermediation adopted by P2P platforms solves the problems identified by the NY Federal Reserve in the 'vertical' model adopted by the 'shadow banking' system. Since each borrower's loan amount is drawn from many lenders at the outset, there’s no need to engage split a single loan into many pieces by securitising later. Lenders also achieve diversification across many borrowers at the start, so there is no need for a series of bonds, CDOs and so on to ‘transform’ interest rates, maturity or borrower type. The facilitator is not a party to the loan agreements made on its platform and segregates lenders’ funds, so it has no credit risk (or ‘balance sheet risk’), and therefore no need or temptation to engage in regulatory/tax arbitrage that banks and shadow banks attempt. The one-to-one legal relationship between borrower and loan owner is maintained for the life of each loan via the same technology platform (with a back-up available), so all the loan data is readily available to participants and it's easy to assess the performance of the loan against its grade. Risk remains visible, rather than being rendered opaque through fragmentation, re-packaging and re-grading of the underlying loans, guarding against moral hazard. 

Finally, by enabling the efficient use of technology to facilitate consumers’ desire for greater control over their personal circumstances, governments will be helping to build a decent, sustainable financial services industry.

Consumers and small businesses should expect further developments in this space throughout 2012.

US Crowdfunding Bill

"It's time for reflection..." FT.com

Further to my recent post on a new regulatory model for retail finance, the US House of Representative has passed a Bill HR 2930 (still subject to Senate and Presidential approval) which would enable the issuer of securities to raise small amounts of money from many people (crowdfunding) on the basis summarised below. Please note that I've used the helpful summary from VentureBeat, but replaced "company" with "issuer", as I see no reason on my reading of the bill and the definition of "issuer" in the Securities Act 1933 why this would not enable person-to-person lending, rather than merely raising capital for corporations. However, I'm not a US securities lawyer, and you should seek your own independent legal advice ;-)

• "The [issuer] may only raise a maximum of $1 million, or $2 million if the [issuer] provides potential investors with audited financial statements.

• Each investor is limited to investing an amount equal to the lesser of (i) $10,000 or (ii) 10% of his or her annual income.

• The issuer or the intermediary, if applicable, must take a number of steps to limit the risk to investors, including (i) warning them of the speculative nature of the investment and the limitations on resale, (ii) requiring them to answer questions demonstrating their understanding of the risks, and (iii) providing notice to the SEC of the offering, including certain prescribed information.”

As mentioned previously, it would be great to see this sort of support for alternative finance from the UK authorities.

FSA, OFT Seek To Avert Another PPI Scandal

Having covered the Great PPI Robbery - and the Redux - via Pragmatist for some years now, it's encouraging to see the FSA and the OFT remaining vigilant against another heist. Listen for any mention of a "debt freeze" or "debt suspension"; or a "debt waiver" or "debt cancellation" during your next discussion about a loan or mortgage - and assume a fee or higher interest rate or the need to make some kind of payment. You should also assume that activating the freeze or waiver will be harder than it looks.

If you think you need the insurance, you probably shouldn't be borrowing at all.

The FSA/OFT consultation on the guidance is open until 13 January 2012.