Final UK Regulations Implementing #PSD2

The UK government has today announced its final approach to implementing the new Payment Services Directive (PSD2), along with the final version of the Payment Services Regulations 2017. A final assessment of the impact of the new regulations is yet to be published. The FCA is expected to finalise its guidance on its approach to supervising PSD2 - along with application forms and so on - by September, and to accept applications for authorisation/registration from October 2017 to meet the implementation deadline of 13 January 2018.

It turns out that the responses to the consultation in February have only persuaded the government to change a few aspects of its approach to implementation (explained below). But it seems from the summaries that many responses didn't account for the fact that the government's hands have been tied since 2015, when the UK agreed the final version of PSD2 at EU level. As it's a maximum harmonisation directive, member states can only depart from PSD2 where it specifically allows them to. The ship has sailed (albeit with some awkward passengers on board, as explained in my own response). For the most part, implementation is now a question of how the FCA interprets the language in its application to the real world, which it consulted on in April. This does not suggest any lack of 'sovereignty', just a failure to influence EU negotiations (assuming those affected took the opportunity to engage at that time).

Ban on surcharging

One area of departure from the government's initial plan is to prohibit retailers from charging customers any additional amount for using any type of payment method/instrument.

The original idea was only to ban surcharging for the use of cards covered by the Interchange Fee Regulation (as required under PSD2), as well as cross border bank transfers and direct debits in euros (under the Single Euro Payments Area regulations); and limit the surcharges for other payment methods to the direct cost borne by the retailer for making them available.

But the government has opted instead for a blanket ban on businesses surcharging consumers for using any type of payment method, on the basis that it: 

"will create a level playing field between payment instruments and create a much clearer picture for consumers in which they know the full price of the product/service they are purchasing upfront and [can be] confident that there will be no additional charges when they come to pay [with] any payment instrument they choose to use. A blanket ban will also be much easier to enforce than the current position in which merchants are able to pass on costs (but the consumer has no easy way of assessing what these are).

Meanwhile, the government says it will "assess the scale" of claims that interchange fees for card payments have been rising again.

Scope of account information services

PSD2 introduces a new “account information service” which basically involves providing information from one or more payment accounts held by the user with one or more other payment service providers.

Initially, the list of services the government said it believed might constitute account information services included some services of a much broader in nature:

"• price comparison and product identification services;

• income and expenditure analysis, including affordability and credit rating or credit worthiness assessments...

[and] might include accountancy or legal services, for example” (para 6.30)."

This provoked concern that the government's interpretation was too broad and overlooked the requirement that an account information service would need to be conducted by way of business in its own right, rather than merely as an ancillary part of a wider service. Examples of services that the government says that respondents were concerned about include: 

"banks’ corporate functions; price comparison websites; accountants; financial advisors; legal firms; and Credit Reference Agencies (CRAs). Many of these services are currently provided via a contractual relationship between service providers, users, and ASPSPs, often referred to as Third Party Mandates (TPMs)."

The government now confirms, however, that:

"many uses of these mandates are likely to be outside of the scope of the PSDII. Examples could include power of attorney, where the services are unlikely to be undertaken ‘in the course of business’."

In addition, the FCA has already suggested this narrower view, based on the 'business test' in its own consultation on how it proposes to supervise PSD2.

Next steps

The FCA is expected to finalise its guidance on its approach to supervising PSD2 - along with application forms and so on for the various types of authorisation/registration - by September, and to accept applications for authorisation/registration from October 2017.

Financial Authorities Need A Fresh Approach To Innovation

The application of the latest technology and business models to finance ("FinTech") is sparking a debate about the role of regulators and their approach to innovation. Senior officials advocate no change, citing various experiments and distinct innovation teams or projects of their own. But the financial system will fail to keep pace with the demands of the broader economy unless a culture of encouraging innovation is embedded throughout our regulators.

Financial innovation is hog-tied to the past. Regulators are conditioned to view innovation through the lens of current services and rules, rather than to consider it afresh. New services are sidelined into policy silos, where they are 'shoe-horned' into existing rules. Regulators seem reluctant to concede that new services reveal shortcomings in existing models and or that they should drive a change in regulatory approach. 

For example, Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England, has said that the Bank of England takes "consistent approaches to activities that give rise to the same risks, regardless of whether those are undertaken by "old regulated" or "new FinTech" firms."  This is because, he claims, "following a raft of post-crisis reforms, the Bank’s regulatory frameworks are now fit for purpose."  

Whose purpose?

Do banks adequately serve their customers?

Do they operate within the law? 

The UK's banks are a constant source of scandal, and frequently incur vast fines and compensation bills for misconduct.  New problems emerge constantly, and on a giant scale. Their role in Russian money laundering is perhaps the latest example. Many of the post-crisis reforms are also yet to take effect in the UK. The critical "ring-fencing" of retail and investment or 'casino' banking, for example, has been watered-down and won't take effect until 2019 - more than a decade after the financial crisis began - while Donald Trump is busy unwinding such reforms in the US. Whether such national initiatives will even be effective in a global system is still unclear.

Despite its name, "FinTech" represents not only the application of technology but also (usually) a customer-oriented commitment to either improve existing financial services or create alternatives that are aligned with customers' requirements. Yet the Bank of England approaches such innovation in the banking sector by asking:

• Which FinTech activities constitute traditional banking activities by another name and should be regulated as such? Systemic risks associated with credit intermediation including maturity transformation, leverage and liquidity mismatch should be regulated consistently regardless of the delivery mechanism.
• How could developments change the safety and soundness of existing regulated firms?  
• How could developments change potential macroeconomic and macrofinancial dynamics including disruptions to systemically important markets? 
• What could be the implications for the level of cyber and operational risks faced by regulated firms and the financial system as a whole?

This is not just a UK phenomenon. When it comes to assessing the application of technology to the financial system Sabine Lautenschlager, Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board of the European Central Bank, also advocates "same business, same risks, same rules." 

Sabine says that "customers want to extend their digital life to banking; they want banking services anytime and anywhere." Yet she points to three "potential futures" for 'banking', none of which acknowledges the benefits of innovation. The only 'benign' scenario she considers is the one where banks "team up with" new entrants (or "fintechs"). A second scenario involves fragmentation into regulated and unregulated activity - nothing new, as the unregulated 'shadow banking' sector was already at the vast, pre-crisis levels in 2015. A third is that "fintechs" might be "swallowed up by big tech companies" making the banking market "more concentrated, less competitive and less diversified" (as if banking isn't already!). But the big tech companies already have regulated financial subsidiaries (mainly offering retail payment services under EU carve-outs from the banking monopoly), and their presence in the market automatically makes it less concentrated, more competitive and more diversified.

The ECB's overall concern seems to be that banking will become less profitable, causing existing players to cut spending on risk management.  But a preoccupation with the impact of innovation on  legacy players dooms the sector to over reliance on legacy firms and inefficient models that effectively require super-normal profits to operate. Mark Carney also points out that concerns about banks cutting corners to keep up with more nimble competitors should not constrain innovation, but is instead a matter for the central bank "to ensure prudential standards and resolution regimes for the affected banks are sufficiently robust to these risks."

The ECB has some strange views on what constitutes risks.  It is said to be inherently risky, for example, that P2P lending platforms are "securitising the loans they originate from their platforms". That maybe how such programmes work in the US, but over there a regulated lender makes a regulated loan and sells it to a listed entity that issues bonds under an SEC-registered prospectus. So any problems are happening right under the noses of the relevant authorities. In the UK, the lenders are free to securitise their portfolios - and several have - but that is not the role of the platform operator. Again, however, this involves regulated activity, both at P2P platform level and through the offer and listing of the relevant bonds.  The regulators are already implicated.

"Robo-advice" is also said to create the risk of investors 'herding' into the same positions at the same time, yet this already happens among regulated fund managers (and banks).  

Risks associated with 'cloud' services and outsourcing of data storage are also cited by the ECB, but these are not new risks at all, or even exclusive to financial services.  

Indeed, what regulators seem to miss is that many of the technological advances that are finally being applied to financial services under the "FinTech" banner have been applied to other sectors for over a decade.

This is not to say that new models are necessarily 'good' or effective. It can also take some time for risks to emerge.  The 'lessons' of the past and the resulting regulatory 'tools' and solutions must not be forgotten, and the old models need to be managed along side the new. But those old models and the rules they require should not be the only lens through which all innovation is analysed. New services must also be viewed afresh.

Will Regulatory Technical Standards Slow The Pace Of Payments Innovation?

Under the new Payment Services Directive (PSD2), the European Banking Authority (EBA) is tasked with producing 'regulatory technical standards' to be followed by those with certain obligations, including how payment service providers (PSPs) must authenticate customers and communicate with each other. But it seems this process and the standards themselves are acting as a brake on innovation and related investment.

The EBA consulted on its proposed regulatory technical standards for authentication and communication between August and October, with a revised set due in the coming months.

PSD2 requires PSPs to apply "strong customer authentication" where "the payer... accesses its payment account online, initiates an electronic payment transaction or carries out any action through a remote channel which may imply a risk of payment fraud or other abuses."

But two big issues raised by PSD2 are (1) how each type of payment is initiated; and (2) who actually initiates it.

The EBA believes card payments are initiated by the cardholder as payer, but fudges the issue somewhat by requiring the card acquirers (i.e. the PSP of the merchants) to require their merchants to support strong authentication for all payment transactions. The added complication is where a payment transaction is initiated by the payee, but the payer's consent is given "through a remote channel which may imply a risk of payment fraud or other abuses".

There is a view, however, that card payments are among those that are in fact initiated by the payee (the merchant), who is not in fact the 'payee' of the cardholder at all but is paid by the card acquirer to which the merchant submits its transactions. The cardholder just pays the card issuer. This is all bound up in fundamental problems with the definitions of "payment transaction", "payer" and "payee" in both the PSD and PSD2; and the fact that card acquiring works through a series of back-to-back contracts that do not involve any direct contract between the buyer and the seller at all concerning payment processing. Indeed, a challenge for the UK's implementation plans is that there is a Court of Appeal decision which supports this view. 

In these respects, PSD2 appears to set up a 'legal fiction', which (despite taking a somewhat purposive approach in the 'fudge' explained above) the EBA appears to insist on in language at the end of its consultation paper: "all the requirements under consultation apply irrespective of the underlying obligations and organisational arrangements between" the various types of PSP, payers and payees. In other words, we have a weird situation where the law and related standards are to be applied regardless of how payment systems and processes really work.

Not only can this lead to situations where, for example, some banks insist that the PSD does not cover card acquiring, but it can also cause over-compliance to avoid doubt and other restraints on innovation.

While distinctions concerning how payments are inititiated and by whom might seem to matter less in the context of security measures to be adopted by PSPs - since everyone is interested in reducing financial crime - it is absolutely critical in the context of software and services that contribute in any way to payments being "initiated" and whether the suppliers or users of such software and services must be authorised as "payment initiation service providers" or perhaps even as the issuers of payment instruments. 

It will be very interesting to see how the Treasury proposes to address these problems in transposing PSD2 itself, although it's more likely the FCA will be left to explain how to comply, assuming the Treasury declines to take a purposive approach to EU law and simply copies the language of PSD2 into UK law (a process known as 'gold-plating').

There are numerous other glitches in the technical standards that have been identified by respondents, too numerous to mention here, but which it is hoped will be reconsidered in the next version - not that such standards should ever be considered as 'final' or set for all time. Indeed, an overarching problem seems to be that in the EBA's attempts to drag our legacy payments infrastructure into the 21st century, insufficient attention has been given to existing and potential alternative security technology - even in cases where incumbents are seeking to leapfrog the limitations of legacy systems.

Meanwhile, a year has slipped by since PSD2 was approved and the standards themselves are only due to take effect in October 2018 'at the very earliest', by which time they are likely to be thoroughly out of step with commercially available technology. 

While old systems may need to be accommodated to some degree, surely the pace of payments innovation should not be tied to the slowest animals in the herd?

The Next Revolution in UK #Payments: Non-bank PSPs and The RTGS

The Bank of England is consulting on the reform of its Retail Gross Settlement System ("RTGS"), which processes half a trillion pounds worth of transactions a day covering almost every payment in the UK economy — from salaries to invoices, from car purchases to retail sales, pensions and investments. 

The system is 20 years old and needs to be reinvented in way that is more flexible and cost-effective. It must interoperate with a wider range of payment systems on a 24x7 basis and better support the increasingly rapid evolution of various new payment methods in the retail, commercial and financial markets.

Responses can be made online by 7 November 2016. 

Privacy Not Core To Your Business? Take The ICO's 12-Step Programme

Though years in the making, it's possible that word of the EU's data protection reforms has yet to penetrate some boardrooms, let alone the IT development roadmaps of UK plc, and the UK Information Comissioner is very concerned that Britain will not be ready to comply. So much so that it has created a new website to urge preparation for the new law - even though the draft directive is not due to be passed until after the UK's referendum on EU membership, and will not take effect until mid-2018. 

Brexit fans should still be concerned. The US will tell you that appropriate privacy safeguards are just one cost of doing business with Europe, and the UK will also need to comply in substance if it is to qualify for cosy trade deals as a non-member of the EU. 

The ICO recommends starting with this 12-step programme.

RegTech Bottleneck?

The UK's Financial Conduct Authority is rightly proud of its Innovation Hub, Regulatory Sandbox and new "RegTech" approach, which includes "managing regulatory requirements more efficiently, and... how we can best support developments and potentially adopt some RegTech solutions ourselves."

But the figures suggest that either more resources are required or there has to be a quicker route to market for new firms.

Of 413 requests received as at February, about 215 firms (52%) obtained support from the FCA's Innovation Hub. But only 39 firms (18%) have either been authorised (18) or are going through the approval process (21).  And in a recent statement defending its record on processing applications for authorisation by P2P lending platforms, the FCA said that it has only processed 8 of 94 applications received (about 9%).

Something is gumming up the works!

In its statement on the P2P lending process, the FCA bravely claims that it is "taking a proportionate approach to regulation, recognising the need for consumers to be adequately protected and have the information they need". It has a deadline of 12 months to decide on applications (actually 6 months for complete applications). But it's not like these firms are trying to flout the law - they have willingly approached the FCA for approval. Indeed, the P2P lending industry spent years lobbying for regulation of the sector, which was introduced by the Treasury in early 2013 and took effect on 1 April 2014. Yet since then the FCA's figures suggest that over 40 new firms have applied to enter the market and 42 of them are unable to trade because their application to do so is yet to be approved. Another 44 firms are still relying on their interim permission by virtue of being licensed under the previous regulatory regime, and therefore (ironically) cannot offer the new Innovative Finance ISA because they are not yet fully authorised.

How many firms are able to persist against these regulatory headwinds remains to be seen, but the approach seems neither proportionate nor worthy of the FCA's ambition to foster innovation and competition for the benefit of consumers. So far, the traditional players remain pretty safely sheltered behind the FCA's regulatory wall.

Something must be done.

Either the FCA needs more resources or it must adopt a more expeditious approach to granting regulatory approval - a mechanism that allows firms to begin trading more quickly under certain thresholds, for example, as is the case with small payment institutions and small e-money institutions. Indeed, payment services firms enjoy their own regulatory regime (with a 3 month turnaround time for complete applications); and the P2P industry lobbied for that regime to be used as the basis for regulating their platforms - an approach which the French and Spanish have since adopted and the European Banking Authority supports.

Need To #Crowdfund Your US Launch? Try Reggae...

... er, that should read "Reg A". 

I'm indebted to Anna Pinedo and Jim Tanenbaum for pointing out that the SEC has finally done its job under Title IV of the JOBS Act. As they carefully explain in a recent Mofo Alert, the amendments to Regulation A that take effect in about 90 days time will enable private US and Canadian companies to raise up to $50 million in a 12 month period. That entity could be the holding company for a UK start-up, for example, or possibly the US subsidiary of a UK start-up, so long as it has a genuine US establishment - you know, real people and office equipment and a decent coffee machine. 

Existing shareholders may also sell reasonable amounts of stock as part of the offering. 

And eligible investors include 'the crowd' - provided they each limit their purchases to no more than 10% of the greater of their annual income or net worth (with a similar limit for non-accredited corporate entities). 

It should also be possible to combine a Reggae Reg A offering with private offering, if you really, really need the extra money.

Adding Peer-to-Peer Loans To #ISAs

The Treasury is consulting on how to implement the government's decision to allow us all to hold peer-to-peer loans within our Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs). This is revolutionary because it increases the range of assets that can be held in ISAs - increasing diversification and therefore the value of the ISA portfolio - and significantly improves the visibility of where your investment money ends up (as I've argued for some time). Adding P2P loans will also change the way ISAs and ISA managers operate, which raises the various questions that the Treasury is consulting on (set out below). This post explains the difference between P2P lending and investing in funds typically held in stocks and shares ISAs, and addresses the main issues outlined by the Treasury.

What are peer-to-peer loans?

Peer-to-peer (or 'P2P') loans are just simple loans agreed directly between lender and borrower. There is no bank or fund manager in the middle, and the operator of the platform on which the loans are agreed is not a party to the loans.

How is P2P lending different to investing in funds?

Perhaps the best way to understand the difference is by starting with the role of the fund manager as opposed to the P2P platform operator. In simple terms, a fund manager collects money paid by investors in return for 'units' in the fund, and then controls the investment of that money in its own name (or that of the fund entity) - so the manager controls the management of the money or other assets in the fund, not the investors,.

However, the operator of a P2P lending platform enables many lenders to lend small amounts of money directly to many different borrowers, and then simply administers the individual loan contracts in accordance with their terms.  So the lenders on a P2P platform, rather than the platform operator, keep control over the management of their money and loan contracts. This is a key reason why P2P loans are a fundamentally different asset class to units in investment funds.

What does this mean for ISA managers?

These differences present a challenge for today's ISA managers - whose job it is to enable you to invest using your annual ISA limits, and keep track of those for HMRC.

Currently, when you buy units in an investment fund through an ISA manager, the manager adds your order to many other orders that it receives and then buys the total number of units in the investment fund in its own name. Each unit is standardised with the same price/value and issued by the same entity. The manager then records how many units it bought on your behalf in its own systems. You have no direct contract or any other link with the investment fund at all.

But on a P2P platform, you agree many small loans directly with lots of other people for the purposes specified, and different platforms tend to specialise in different types of loans (personal loans, working capital for small businesses, commercial property etc). Everyone's holding is different, even though some lenders end up lending to the same borrower. You also directly agree the platform's fee, if any, which may be waived in some cases (sometimes the borrower pays the fees, for tax reasons, leaving the lender with just the net income).

So existing ISA managers will probably need to make systems changes to enable it to track your own unique holdings of P2P loans in your ISA, and it seems likely they'll want to see a lot of demand before they do so. Accordingly, to meet demand for P2P loans in ISAs it's likely that the operators of P2P lending platforms will become ISA managers in their own right.

What does this mean for ISA rules?

You will probably be able to withdraw P2P loans from ISAs without having to sell them and take the cash.

ISA assets can typically be transferred between ISA managers, but that isn't practicable between different P2P platforms, so it's likely that any transfer would only work by selling the loans and transferring the cash directly to the other ISA manager. However, the Treasury is not sure whether to require this, as it could discriminate against platforms that do not have ready secondary markets for the loans agreed on their platforms. Another reason not to insist on transferability is that even if there were a secondary market, there could be a delay in finding a buyer for the loans, as opposed to just waiting for them to be repaid; and a 'forced' sale could mean a low market price, even from a market-maker or underwriter.

The Treasury is also interested in arrangements for continuing to manage P2P loans in ISAs in the event that the P2P platform operator ceases to qualify as an ISA manager, similar to the FCA requirements for administration of loans in the event that the operator ceases to trade.

The Treasury is still not sure whether to allow P2P loans to be kept in their own ISA or in a stocks and shares ISA. However, assuming P2P platforms are likely to need to become ISA managers in their own right, it would seem unduly onerous to make them apply for the extra FCA permissions required to offer other investments available through stocks/shares ISAs. So I'd suggest that there will need to be a third 'P2P loans ISA', or at least the ability for platform operators to offer a stocks/shares ISA that is limited only to holding P2P loans.

The Treasury expresses some concern that P2P lending on behalf of children through Child Trusts Funds (CTFs) or Junior ISAs could mean that the parent or guardian and not the child will be the one who understands the business activity or loan purpose of the business/personal borrower. But this is no worse than investing in a managed fund where you don't know the precise mix of the constituent stocks/shares or even the actual issuers and therefore their businesses or use of proceeds.

Finally, the Treasury believes that title to P2P loans made via CTFs and Junior ISAs would need to be held by the ISA manager or some third party, as loans made by minors are not enforceable (as a matter of contract law).

Those Treasury questions in full:

1. In relation to the proposals generally, what necessary set-up costs (one-off costs) would be necessary for your business to arrange peer-to-peer loans meeting the proposed eligibility requirements for ISAs? What would be the estimated ongoing annual costs of doing so?
2. Do respondents agree that the government’s proposed approach provides sufficient clarity as to which peer-to-peer loans will be eligible for ISA inclusion?
3. Do respondents agree that the proposed regulatory requirements strike the correct balance between investor protection and a proportionate regulatory regime?
4. Are existing ISA managers considering offering peer-to-peer loans alongside other ISA eligible investments? What factors may affect this decision?
5. Are firms operating peer-to-peer platforms considering seeking authorisation to act as ISA managers if the government permits this? What factors may affect this decision?
6. Do respondents have any concerns regarding FCA-authorised firms operating peer-to-peer platforms being allowed to act as ISA managers? If so, what are they?
7. Do respondents see any risks arising from firms operating peer-to-peer platforms approved as ISA managers not being required to have legal ownership of peer-to-peer loans held within ISAs?
8. Are there any drawbacks to the proposed withdrawal procedure for peer-to-peer loans? If so, what are they?
9. If the transfer requirement is applied to peer-to-peer loans – do respondents foresee any risks or detriment for consumers resulting from the proposed modification of the current ISA requirements? If so, what are these?
10. Following the sale of the peer-to-peer loan and transfer instructions from the investor, what would be the most appropriate time period within which the cash realised should be transferred?
11. Is the proposed modification to transfer requirements t likely to present any difficulties or administrative obstacles for ISA managers (including those receiving transfers)? If so, what are these?
12. What are respondents’ views on requiring the existence of a secondary market in order for a peer-to-peer loan to qualify for ISA eligibility? Would such a requirement provide a useful degree of reassurance to investors?
13. Would a requirement to offer a secondary market pose any problems or difficulties for peer-to-peer platforms and if so, what are these? Could secondary market arrangements of this type be easily defined?
14. Do respondents think that a guarantee of a sale at market value within a given period would be desirable in addition to the proposed requirement of a secondary market?
15. Is there merit for investors in requiring that there must be a mechanism by which loans can be sold at market value within a given period? What period should this be, taking account of the times taken at present to achieve sales on existing secondary markets?
16. Are there other ways in which to facilitate transferability, besides those described above? If so, how might these work?
17. Overall, do respondents feel that the benefits to investors from applying transfer requirements to peer-to-peer loans held in ISAs outweigh the possible risks of doing so?
18. Do respondents have suggestions as to how loans held within ISAs could continue to be managed by an ISA manager in cases where either a firm operating a peer-to-peer platform collapses and they were acting as ISA manager, or where such a firm becomes ineligible to act as an ISA manager following removal of its FCA permissions?
19. How important is it that investors should be able to mix peer-to-peer loans with other eligible investments within their ISA in a single tax year? Do respondents believe most investors wishing to place peer-to-peer loans into an ISA account will additionally want to invest in other types of non-cash ISA investments within the same tax year?
20. Would a third ISA type be helpful in alerting investors to the different rules which will apply to peer-to-peer loans within ISAs? Overall, would a third ISA type aimed specifically at alternative finance products such as peer-to-peer loans be a good thing – and if so, why?
21. What potential difficulties or challenges might the creation of a third ISA type present for savers, investors, ISA managers or others?
22. If the government decides not to introduce a third ISA type, how can we best ensure that customers are clear about the special characteristics associated with peer-to-peer loans, for example that they are not covered by the FSCS, and that they may be difficult to liquidate?
23. Do respondents have any concerns about offering a tax advantage where loans made by or on behalf of children might be made without knowledge of the intended recipient(s) or usage of the loaned funds? If so, what are they?
24. Do respondents agree that if peer-to-peer loans are made eligible for CTFs and Junior ISAs, these loans should be in the legal ownership of the ISA manager? If not – what alternative approach might be considered?

A Short History Of The P2P Marketplace Model in UK Finance

During a recent panel discussion at the annual conference of the Society for Computers and Law, I explained briefly how the online peer-to-peer marketplace, pioneered by eBay in the US, came to be applied in financial services in the UK. The slides are here, and below is a slightly longer written explanation. Note that the focus is on the history, rather than explaining the differences between various types of 'crowdfunding'.

eBay pioneered person-to-person sales of second-hand items in the US from 1995, proving the concept to be hugely attractive. The particular "'Aha!' moment" came when people actually paid for the item they'd agreed to buy, not to mention the delivery of the item.

In 1999, the team at X.com (later PayPal) expanded the eBay model into payments by enabling consumers to pay each other using a credit card. This was rapidly adopted by eBay users (to the point where eBay eventually had to buy PayPal as a defensive measure). Coincidentally, in the same year it became clear to the entrepreneurs who had created PlusLotto, an online lottery in aid of the Red Cross, that the payment part of their system, which enabled people to prepay funds in many different currencies to centralised bank accounts then log-in to their data accounts or 'wallets' to purchase lottery tickets with the balance, should be made available to other merchants. They started Earthport as a separate payments provider the same year, and I was among those asked to join the board of the new entity. The initial strategy was to roll-out the wallet offering directly to consumers and merchants. But in 2000 we raised £25m through a private placement - literally weeks before the DotCom bubble burst - to fund a switch in strategy. The plan was to leverage the marketing budgets of banks, telcos and major Internet portals to offer own-branded wallets to their customers. Of course, those plans ran into the headwind created by the tech slump. But I'm happy to report that Earthport remains alive and well.

Meanwhile, in 2003, a team at artistShare in the US adapted the P2P payments model to enable music fans to donate money to fund musicians and music projects. The reason for this donation-based model of 'crowdfunding' was the need to avoid US securities regulation, which is notoriously rigid and complex, and applies expensive registration requirements even to very simple loans. The battle to liberate that regime continues to this day (see below).

At any rate, late in 2003, a small group of executives left Egg, the internet bank (which also happened to be one of Earthport's early customers), to try to reinvent financial services. During their brainstorming process, Dave Nicholson, suggested 'eBay for money' and the idea took hold. Coincidentally, they approached me in the summer of 2004 to see if I could help avoid any US-style regulatory problems. By the time we launched Zopa, the P2P lending platform, in March 2005 we had moved away from the idea of eBay-style 'auctions' to a more automated marketplace for personal loans. Borrowers and lenders had told us they did not want to reveal too much about themselves to each other, but were happy to give Zopa enough information to guard against fraud, assess creditworthiness and match their bids and offers to produce loan contracts directly between them.

 

In 2010, the team at FundingCircle applied the P2P lending model to the small business lending market. They also enabled direct loans between each lender and business entity. But to provide security for the additional risk of lending larger amounts to businesses, they introduced a separate entity that would hold security over the assets of the borrower in trust for the lenders. That trustee entity could then enforce the security on the lenders' behalf if the borrower defaulted under the P2P loans. Since then, this model has also been introduced to the commercial property sector.

It was only a matter of  time before the P2P marketplace model penetrated the investment world. In 2011, Crowdcube launched the concept of enabling many individual investors to finance unlisted start-up companies in return for shares. And a team that included Bruce Davis, an ethnographer who had helped develop both Egg's and Zopa's marketing propositions, launched Abundance Generation to fund alternative energy projects by selling long term debentures to retail investors who could use the returns to pay their own energy bills.

 

The same year, the Peer-to-Peer Finance Association was launched to call for proportionate regulation of the peer-to-peer lending sector.

 

Since 2011 many different types of P2P lending, crowdfunding and crowd-investment platforms have launched. Approximately 30 platforms signed a letter to EU and UK policy makers at a P2P finance policy summit held in London in December 2012, and many others have launched since.

 

In March 2014, the first FCA rules took effect which specifically regulate both peer-to-peer lending and crowd-investment. The EU has since convened a "European Crowdfunding Stakeholders Forum" to help determine whether there is scope for EU regulation to help develop the sector.

 

Clearly we are still witnessing the dawn of this trend. 

 

PS on the US:

 

While this post has focused on the UK, it is worth mentioning that we attempted to launch Zopa's P2P model in the US during 2006-07. However, it was clear from our own regulatory discussions, and the subsequent experience of Prosper.com, that the Securities Exchange Commission was determined to view simple loans as securities that require registration and intermediation using the same model that applies to more complex instruments. Zopa declined to launch that type of model, but it had to be deployed subsequently by Lending Club and Prosper (a similar version was also deployed by Prodigy Finance in the UK, due to the need to support international cross-border lending activity). Essentially, rather than agreeing loans directly with individual borrowers, investors buy bonds that are backed by loans made to those borrowers by a licensed lending entity. The lending entity sells the loans to the bond issuer, which distributes the loan repayments to the bondholders. While the JOBS Act was supposed to liberate crowdfunding in the US, the SEC has been less than enthusiastic in implementing it. Fortunately, UK regulators have been positively supportive and it's important to note that the SEC does not have any responsibility to promote innovation and competition, while the FCA clearly does. 

Feedback on FCA Project Innovate Workshops

The Financial Conduct Authority has published its summary of the feedback it received in relation to its proposals to support innovation in financial services ("Project Innovate").

A striking aspect is the negative, limited view of innovation from established, regulated firms, compared to small innovators and non-regulated firms. This seems to underscore how protected the existing providers have been from external competition to date.

Worth providing feedback on the summary, and any solutions to problems identified.

Following the Financial Innovation Lab session in May and the Project Innovate session I attended in August, I still recommend a short 'small firms registration process' that would allow all new firms to enter the market more quickly and operate under certain thresholds before going through the lengthy full authorisation process if they can succeed in growing (as for small payment/e-money institutions).

Entrepreneurs: Help The FCA Help You!

Great news: the Financial Conduct Authority is continuing its efforts to support innovation in financial services, and is offering both entrepreneurs and innovative firms the chance to sense-check its approach.

Following the session with the Finance Innovation Lab in May and its June announcement of Project Innovate, the FCA has just issued a mercifully short consultation paper on its plans and arranged a series of summer workshops on:

• how entrepreneurs can get authorised more efficiently; 
• figuring out how non-regulated businesses can engage with the FCA in an Innovation Hub to help them collaborate with regulated businesses while avoiding the need for regulation; and 
• how regulated firms could engage with innovative firms and the FCA via the Innovation Hub.

Specific questions on which the FCA also welcomes your answers before 5 September are:

1. Is there anything about the regulatory system that poses particular difficulties for innovator businesses?
2. What practical assistance do you think the Incubator could usefully provide to small innovator firms?
3. Do you think it would be useful to establish an Innovation Hub function?
4. What criteria should we use in order to focus our resources on ‘genuine, ground-breaking’ innovation?
5. Do you have any other feedback or suggestions about Project Innovate?

This is a fabulous opportunity for everyone in the UK's FinTech sector to help the FCA improve its authorisation and guidance processes to support new businesses, so please get involved.

EBA Seeks To Freeze Link Between Actual And Virtual Currencies

On Friday, the European Banking Authority advised EU national financial regulators to "discourage" credit institutions (banks), payment institutions and e-money institutions from buying, holding or selling virtual currencies, based on over 70 risks that it says will require substantial regulation. The EBA says that should include bringing virtual currency exchanges which deal between virtual and actual currencies within the anti-money laundering regime.

Somewhat cryptically, the EBA concludes:

"Other things being equal, this immediate response will allow VC schemes to innovate and develop outside of the financial services sector, including the development of solutions that would satisfy regulatory demands of the kind specified above. The immediate response would also still allow financial institutions to maintain, for example, a current account relationship with businesses active in the field of VCs."

But there are many flaws in the EBA’s approach, and it undermines the EU’s potential as a home for financial services innovation. A lot more work should have been done - and the EBA should have engaged with the market participants publicly and constructively - before taking such disruptive action. Especially given that those participants (including venture capitalists and possibly financial institutions) should have a legitimate expectation to be able to continue their lawful involvement, unless the law is changed by the usual process. 

The EBA concedes as much by saying that it is too early to collect enough data to understand exactly what they are "shielding" financial institutions from: 

"...the phenomenon of [virtual currencies] being assessed has not existed for a sufficient amount of time for there to be quantitative evidence available of the existing risks, nor is this of the quality required for a robust ranking."

So what is the basis for intervening in this way now? Gut instinct?

There is obvious duplication and overlap amongst the risks identified and many “are similar, if not identical, to risks arising from conventional financial services or products, such as payment services or investment products”, as are the regulatory controls that are suggested for the longer term. Key benefits of virtual currencies are also dismissed in the context of the EU and Eurozone on the basis of regulations that are yet to take effect. 

Oddly, the EBA points to a risk that regulating virtual currencies more leniently will create an unequal playing field that could result in service providers leaving fiat currency markets in favour of their virtual cousins. Surely that risk is heightened by denying financial institutions early access to virtual markets altogether. Has the EBA learned nothing from the rise of shadow banking? Won't this breed weak regulated institutions? Won't entrepreneurs simply operate outside the EU, leaving its institutions unable to capitalise on opportunities that virtual currencies might have brought? 

And why would the EU want to discourage borderless financial services while it's trying so hard to kickstart cross-border commerce?

A requirement for fully comprehensive regulation cannot be the price of institutional participation in virtual currency markets. There is a flawed belief amongst Eurocrats that ‘vigorous regulation’ is a pre-condition for consumer trust, as Paul Nemitz recently asserted. But that is not supported by the way in which the digital economy has evolved. Regulation can help build on existing trust, but cannot create trust where none existed before. This difference between the civil law and common law view of the role of regulation needs to be resolved in favour of a more acommodating EU approach to innovation and competition if the EU member states are to compete globally. For instance, the UK Cabinet Office convened a workshop on financial innovation in October 2013, which featured a session on virtual currencies; and UK revenue officials were helpful in merely clarifying their tax treatment of virtual currencies earlier this year. More recently, the Financial Action Taskforce (FATF) was also much more circumspect in a report that was intended to “stimulate a discussion” on how to introduce risk-based anti-money laundering controls in the context of virtual currencies. 

The EBA's intervention is further evidence that the EU financial regulatory regime needs to be much more open to innovation and competition if we are to avoid the pitfalls discussed in the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards.

A more detailed review of the EBA opinion has since been published at the Society for Computers and Law.

FCA Announces #ProjectInnovate

Hard on the heels of the Transforming Finance workshop, the FCA announced in a speech by CEO Martin Wheatley last week that it will support innovators by: 

• providing 'advice on compliance' to firms who are developing new models or products advice so they can navigate the regulatory system;

• looking for areas where the system itself needs to adapt to new technology or broader change – rather than the other way round; and

• launching an incubator to help innovative, small financial businesses ready themselves for regulatory authorisation.

The umbrella term for these initiatives is "Project Innovate". I look forward to hearing more about it, including contact details etc.

How The FCA Could Support Innovation And Diversity In Financial Services

Hats off to the Financial Conduct Authority for hosting and participating in The Finance Innovation Lab's recent workshop on Transforming Finance. It was an excellent, productive discussion and seems likely to help drive helpful change. For the sake of transparency, here are my notes/thoughts (unattributed, on the basis of Chatham House Rules).

The FCA board is interested in how the financial services market can be 'disrupted' in ways that are positive for consumers and small businesses. There is a new awareness of how regulatory uncertainty can be a barrier to entry/growth; and the need to get better at recognising the harm that comes from stifling good initiatives.

Key aspects of beneficial disruption include, innovation, diversity, and competition. There is evidence that competition within markets alone is insufficient, and can actually drive mis-selling (e.g. banks competed to sell PPI). Increasing diversity is also necessary, to enable competition amongst different business models and services in the same market. This requires the FCA to consider how firms outside the regulated markets are delivering better consumer outcomes, as well as firms within the regulated markets.

Greater transparency around fees, incentives and conflicts of interest allows excessive fees to attract competition and/or disintermediation; and the removal/re-alignment of perverse incentives and conflicts of interest.  

FCA could foster innovation with: 

• a 'sandbox' for entrepreneurs/innovators to consider how new models might be impacted by rules - this could include an online method for extracting all the rules in the Handbook that relate to a certain product or activity; 
• pre-authorisation workshops to coach firms through the evolution to authorsiation and obtain feedback on problems and potential improvements; 
• a shortened, small firms registration process that would allow new entrants to operate under certain thresholds before going through the lengthy full authorisation process (as for small payment/e-money institutions);
• a small firms unit made up of staff from each of the FCA's main 'silos' to ensure joined-up focus on innovation and diversity, consistency, fairness and positive discrimination in favour of sensible initiatives.

The regulatory/policy environment needs to be more open and accessible. We need to know which staff are responsible for what. The FCA tends to draft its rules and communicate in its own unique language, rather than in the language of the markets it regulates or even the same terms used in directives/regulations it is supposed to implement. It also needs to 'get out more', and participate in more forums involving firms, trade bodies, policy officials from relevant departments (e.g. Treasury and BIS) and the European Commission. There should be more public roadshows, roundtables etc - perhaps the FCA could host an annual, wider version of the P2P Finance Policy Summit that was run in December 2012? The consultation process should more positively discriminate in favour of those outside the incumbent firms, it should be more socially networked with a more widely telegraphed timetable. In this context it would also be helpful for the FCA to keep a register of who is lobbying it (e.g. as Ministers must disclose). There should be a body to scrutinise what the FCA (and HMT) is consulting on and how the consultation process operates.

The FCA views the market through the lens of products, and types of firms and their activities, rather than from the standpoint of the customer and how the customer can be empowered to achieve their own financial outcome. The customer is seen as victim, whereas the tide of technology and innovation is delivering greater control to the customer (e.g. over personal data - and financial transactions are just another type of data).

The FCA needs to participate in the debate over the best means of credit creation - should we separate banks' role in money creation from their role in actually allocating credit? Should we strip banks of their role in creating money altogether, as covered by Martin Wolf recently. 

How do we distinguish genuine innovation or invention from merely incremental changes to existing models/products? New rules should be tested for their potential impact on diversity, innovation and competition.

The Financial Services Consumer Panel and Smaller Business Practitioner Panel should have specific obligations to consider the above issues, as well as the interests of alternative finance providers and civil society more generally.

Interested in your thoughts!

Could The FCA Do More To Foster Innovation In Financial Services?

Previously I've suggested that two things are choking the flow of money to people and small businesses who need it: broken regulation and perverse incentives. So it's important to give some credit for work on both fronts.

Financial regulation remains overly complex, but at least some reforms have been made to welcome innovation and competition at the retail level. And the recent budget showed the government is keen to ensure that ISAs and pensions encourage people to put their eggs in more than one basket. The FCA has also done some impressive research into insurance add-ons.

However, for this momentum to be maintained, financial regulation must become even more welcoming of innovation and competition - and much simpler and transparent for everyone to understand. So here are seven suggestions:

1. Tailored rulebooks: By the FCA's own admission, about 10% of the rules spread throughout its giant, ever-expanding 'Handbook' are relevant to each regulated activity. But the FCA does not gather the relevant rules into 'tailored' rulebooks, as the FSA used to do. That means everyone must waste time and resources wading through the 90% of rules that don't apply to their given activity. But it's worth noting that the FCA still maintains the helpful “Approach” documents that explain its separate regimes for e-money and payment services. Why not adopt this same 'approach' in other areas?
2. Registered small firms option: The FCA authorisation process involves 6 to 9 months' work in advance of filing, at an estimated cost of £150,000 per firm (see note 10 from this Treasury/Cabinet Office workshop). It then takes another 3 to 12 months to become authorised, depending on the permission required. This makes funding the launch of a new financial service very expensive compared to an unregulated service, and the slow time to market increases the risk of failure (ironically). A 'registered small firms' option already exists in relation to e-money and payment services, and would reduce the cost and delay of market entry for firms preparing for full authorisation. It should be brought in more broadly.
3. Client-money banking platform: Many authorised firms are obliged to 'safeguard' their clients' money by keeping it separate from their own funds in 'segregated' bank accounts. UK banks can be particularly slow and uncooperative in opening these accounts, which delays time to market. This, along with the recent financial and IT problems amongst UK banks, suggests it might be wise to 'ring fence' segregated accounts on a separate platform, possibly under the supervision of the new Payments Regulator.
4. Small Investor Option: Any web designer will tell you that the more 'clicks' you put in the way of a consumer, the less likely it is the consumer will go through a process. So 'dialogue boxes' that require people to certify things or take tests to invest in bonds or shares will also deter them. That's a barrier to the adoption of new 'crowd-investment' services, which many people might prefer to try out with small amounts. In fact it's far easier to gamble on lotteries and bingo than it is to invest. So allowing people to be invited to invest up to, say, £250 in debt securities or shares per project on authorised crowd-investment platforms with a clear, fair and not misleading description of the risks, but without any form of certification, advice or appropriateness test would seem appropriate (see the French proposals for crowd-investment).
5. Platform-level regulation: current financial regulation operates on the basis of different types of activity related to certain types of legal instrument, regardless of the customer experience. However, the online 'marketplace' model is now being applied to many different types of financial service, enabling people to transact directly with each other in relation to payments, savings, loans and investments, for example. Insurance and other services will likely follow down this path. This offers the chance to removing doubt and duplication by regulating common operational risks with a single set of rules at the platform level, with relatively few extra rules for different types of instruments or different types of activity being financed.
6. FCA 'Sandbox': coupled with the registered small firms option, the FCA could maintain a more dynamic focus on innovation and competition if it offered a dedicated space or channel for evaluating new services - both inside and outside the regulated sphere - which would also help it decide whether to flex its rules to suit.
7. Seek solutions from outside the existing market: the FCA should not assume that every innovation is designed to circumvent the existing regime to the detriment of customers. There are plenty of entrepreneurs who have spotted opportunities created by poor banking and are trying to increase transparency and reduce costs. So where the FCA is aware of existing consumer detriment or other market problems, it could present these to the market in open 'innovation workshops' - similar to those fostered by the Treasury/Cabinet Office - and/or release them into its 'sandbox'.

Your thoughts?

Crowdfunding Guest Post On Nesta...

My guest post on the impact of regulation on crowdfunding in the UK is now up on Nesta's "Economic Growth" blog. The overview appears as one of a series of posts that accompany Nesta's crowdfunding directory at Crowdingin.com, which lists information on platforms open to fundraising from individuals and businesses in the UK.

Why Doesn't The ECB Try P2P?

horizontal vs vertical credit intermediation

In April, European officials finally realised that Europe's banks will be unable to lend enough to small businesses to finance economic recovery. The failure of the UK's Funding for Lending scheme has not gone unnoticed. So rather than establish an EU version of that scheme, the European Central Bank has been considering whether to kick-start a small business securitisation market. Last week, however, the ECB played down that idea. After all, the banks don't have the capability to make enough loans in the first place, and the 'shadow banking' sector has demonstrated that it can't reliably price endless tiers of bonds, CDOs, CDOs of CDOs.

So now what?

Peer-to-peer lending has grown rapidly in the UK, despite an awkward (though permissive) regulatory framework and perverse tax incentives. That headwind is changing, as even the UK government has begun lending on some platforms, and officials are getting on with the job of bringing P2P lending firmly within the regulatory sphere.

Oddly, perhaps, those regulatory changes are being made in the context of moving the supervision of consumer credit from the Office of Fair Trading to the Financial Conduct Authority in April 2014. However, that merely reflects the fact that P2P lending originated in the personal loan market, whereas there are now platforms that facilitate business loans, asset finance and commercial real estate funding. In other words, P2P lending has expanded into institutional investor territory, which should be of real interest to the ECB as it looks beyond the banking sphere.

As I've pointed out many times since 2010, a key feature of P2P lending platforms is that each borrower's loan amount is provided via many tiny, direct loans from many different lenders at inception. This permits lenders to diversify at the outset, so that loan maturities and rates of return do not need to be 'transformed' via securitisation later on.  Enforcement and due diligence are made easy on P2P platforms because the one-to-one legal relationship between borrower and lender is maintained for the life of the loan, and the performance data also remains readily available via the lender's account. This enables P2P lenders to avoid the concentration of credit risk that securitisation tends to obscure through endless re-packaging and re-grading, and the ensuing disconnect between bonds and the underlying loans. 

It will also be of special interest to the ECB that the scope for moral hazard is contained in the P2P context - the platform operator itself has no balance sheet risk, yet is able to implement all the compliance and operational risk controls one would ordinarily expect of lenders. This brings regulatory efficiencies, too. The authorities need only supervise the P2P platform operator rather than the lenders and borrowers on either side, who are effectively just payers and payees, as in the case of a payment institution. Funnily enough, that's the reason the UK's Peer-to-Peer Finance Association borrowed the substance of its "Operating Principles" from the Payment Services Directive - a piece of legislation with which the ECB is also very familiar...

That paves the way for anyone to lend to consumers and small businesses via P2P platforms without any concern about the need for lender-licensing. Indeed, the UK's Financial Conduct Authority has said that it intends providing investor-type protection for P2P lenders. That would mean exemptions for marketing P2P lending to high net worth and sophisticated investors and professional investment firms. So it would be strange to also require such investors to be separately authorised to lend, especially when the platform operator is taking care of all the compliance obligations. It would be like requiring a firm to be authorised to deposit money in the bank or to make payments via a payment institution - just red tape.

Given access to loan capital on that industrial scale, the ECB could justifiably view P2P lending to small businesses as a significant potential driver of economic growth. 

Lawyers Who Code

My name is Simon and I can't code. 

There. I've said it. Despite working with and around computers since 1990, I can't really tell one what to do - at least not in any language it will respond to. 

But as internet and mobile technology becomes ever more accessible, it's becoming clear that computer programming is something I should learn. After all, it's really about writing rules and I write contracts all the time. Since writing the article on Linked Data for the SCL in March, it's also occured to me that more and more legal contracts should be capable of being acted upon by machines without any human intervention. Indeed, as a colleague on the SCL Media Board pointed out today, Creative Commons licences have a machine-readable layer, as well as legal code and human readable layers - which is also something we discussed in the WEF's tiger team on Rethinking Personal Data in June last year.

So I've decided to get a Raspberry Pi and give it a whirl. No doubt I'll struggle to find the time, and maybe the kids will learn faster than me, but so it goes with the guitar and piano. Hopefully it will be as much fun.

In the meantime, I'd love to hear from any lawyers (or others) who've learned to code, how they're getting on with it and any top tips on how to go about it.

Payday Loans: Can Borrowers Have Speed, Convenience And Affordability?

Source: OFT

Problems with payday lending are not new. As with payment protection insurance, campaigners in the US were attempting to address poor practices in this area long before they rose to prominence in the UK - and still are. Regulatory solutions don't seem to make much difference. However, recent research shows that 46% of the UK's online borrowers shop around, versus 28% of those on the high street. This suggests technology may also help ensure compliance with affordability requirements, if only creditors would provide transaction and fees data in machine-readable format.

In its consultation on Payday Lending in the UK, the OFT estimates that the volume of payday loans has grown from £900m to £2.2bn since 2008. It says the top 3 providers account for 57% of all payday loans, but concedes the number of lenders has grown from 96 in 2009 to 190 in 2012. This growth, and the efforts of UK campaigners, sparked the OFT's payday lending compliance review in February 2012. As a result of that review, the OFT is now considering a referral of the industry to the Competition Commission, though it believes the transfer of its own regulatory role to the Financial Conduct Authority in 2014 "is likely to increase regulatory costs and make entry to the payday lending market more difficult."

True, the FCA will have more powers, e.g. to limit the number of roll-overs, cap interest rates and control advertising (see the Treasury and FCA consultation papers on the transfer of consumer credit). But the past decade here and in the US has shown that regulation itself is no panacea. Technology appears to have had a bigger impact, both in terms of access and the ability to shop around, and this suggests that technology represents the best avenue for addressing affordability issues.

It's important to start with the borrower. You can't ignore the fact that 90% of online customers who responded to the OFT survey find it "quick and convenient" to get a short term loan and 81% say it makes it easier to manage when money is tight. Customers expressed their satisfaction in terms of decision speed (36%), convenience (35%) and customer service (27%). While affordability therefore appears to be a secondary consideration for all concerned, that's a bit misleading. Research shows that customers ignore the annualised interest rate and look at the absolute charges. These may make loan cost comparison harder, but makes more sense to someone who believes he's only borrowing for a month - which is the case for 72% of payday loans (see graphic). Assessing affordability is also hard - especially for the borrower, on whom the lender is largely relying to provide the relevant figures.

It is therefore no suprise that the industry advertising generally emphasises 'time to cash'.  But the OFT also found that some lenders seem to skimp on credit and affordability checks in order to deliver that speed. You would think that's a dangerous game for lenders to play when their own money is at risk. But the OFT found that about half lenders' revenue come from the 28% of loans that 'roll-over' at least once before being repaid (see graphic). Instinctively, that looks bad. But if those loans are so valuable to lenders, it seems odd that the OFT found little evidence of competition for them loans that are about to roll-over. Perhaps borrowers think they have no alternative at that point, or perhaps they don't care about the cost. But it's also consistent with the fact that these borrowers - and lenders - find it really hard to assess affordability.

While the OFT will decide in June whether to refer the payday lending 'market' to the Competition Commission, you can see from Annex A to its report that it's struggling to define that market. There's a long list of potentially competing finance products. But there are at least 4 unmentioned 'gorillas in the room'. The 'silverback' is the overall debt scenario facing any borrower considering a payday loan. Another gorilla in this troop is the charge for unapproved overdrafts, about which the OFT is understandably gun-shy after its long-running court battle with the banks. Yet another is the fact that when you use a credit card you have no ready means of knowing what the outstanding balance is, as some transactions may not yet be recorded, and interest and charges may only be added to the bill at the end of the month. That's a common reason that the so-called 'financial excluded' give for not trusting financial services, including cheque books and debit cards. The final gorilla in the troop is the borrower's overall financial situation, including the non-financial implications of failing to pay existing or potential creditors, like kids having no school shoes...

However, like a credit reference search itself, these gorillas are all really data problems that are capable of a technological solution, as I've explained previously. Rather than skimp on affordability checks, lenders should figure out how to enable them to be carried out quickly and conveniently. Small lenders might share the cost of a common underwriting platform, for example. But, more importantly, borrowers need to be armed with an application that very simply presents an option that is affordable, based on the analysis of their own transaction data (including fees) from their existing creditors, and the competing costs of different financing options (including charges for missing a payment). 

This may sound futuristic, but it only requires a commitment on the part of all the typical creditors and financial services providers to make this data available to their customers (or their nominated service provider) in machine-readable format. The analysis can be done by either the customer's or a supplier's computer, with the results accessible either online or physically, via a print-out. 

There are plenty of examples of individual customers' transaction data being made available to them or their nominees in this way already, and the immediate focus of the government's voluntary 'Midata' programme is to persuade the banks, telcos and energy companies to do this for all their customers (rather than only those with internet banking accounts, for example). 

Problems like the affordability issues in the £2.2bn payday lending sector represent a good argument for getting on with it.